The possibility of a future hostile, aggressive Russia with substantial nuclear forces continues to place the most stressful demands on the prospective U.S. strategic nuclear posture. Current U.S. policy on deterring this kind of Russia (a strong Russia gone bad) means being able to ***hold at risk*** those targets that the United States believes a potentially hostile Russian leadership would value. Historically, implementing the ***hold-at-risk*** doctrine has meant meeting a high standard of target destruction in four categories: (1) nuclear forces, (2) other military forces, (3) economic and industrial targets, and (4) leadership and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) assets. Because being able to hold at risk Russia’s strategic forces is only one part of the strategy, further reductions in Russian nuclear forces would probably not yield further significant reductions in U.S. nuclear requirements regarding Russia.

http://www.ndu.edu/INSS/strforum/SF177/sf177.html